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Dynamic Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda
Setting in the U.S. House
“Americans should know where their Representatives stand on the issues before going
into the voting booth. But Speaker Pelosi and Senator Reid have delayed dealing with
a number of far-reaching and controversial issues until after Election Day precisely so
Democrats do not have to reveal to the electorate their support for more trillion dollar
deficits, tax hikes on families and small businesses, and a job-killing national energy
tax.”
—Statement by Rep. Tom Price (R-GA) in support of a resolution he introduced to
block the use of the lame-duck session to pass non-emergency legislation
Introduction
Political parties have a conflicted existence in many democratic systems (Carey, 2007; Lebo, McG-
lynn and Koger, 2007). On the one hand, voters rely heavily upon party labels at the voting booth
(Markus and Converse, 1979), and reward parties for legislative successes (Bowler, Farrell and Katz,
ed., 1999; Cox and McCubbins, 2007). Thus, there are clear incentives for party coalescence. Yet,
at the same time, voters punish individual legislators for partisan behavior (Soroka and Wlezien,
2010; Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young, 2010), which in turn discourages party cooperation. How,
then, do legislators navigate these countervailing incentives? We theorize that legislators, both
individually and collectively, balance these competing demands by adopting a dynamic approach
to partisanship.
In this study, we investigate the effects of competing demands on elite partisanship in the context
of the U.S. House of Representatives. We find that legislators, both individually and collectively,
balance competing demands by strategically adjusting their levels of partisanship relative to elec-
tions. Specifically, legislators place greater weight on partisan goals when elections are distant, and
are increasingly attentive to constituency demands as elections approach. While our substantive
focus is the U.S. House, this should not distract from the much broader theoretical argument: the
presence of countervailing incentives encourages partisan behavior that is sensitive to the variable
costs and benefits of cooperation across time. This basic framework, we believe, provides leverage
in understanding legislative behavior in numerous other contexts. Indeed, recent comparative stud-
ies have offered evidence that politicians across various political systems face analogous competing
demands that place party and electoral goals at odds with one another (e.g., Carey, 2008; Tavits,
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2011). There is also strong reason to believe that even in electoral systems with a negligible personal
vote component, parties must still balance competing demands from voters and other principals
(e.g., Karp and Bowler, 2001).
Moreover, the dynamics we uncover have important implications for the general study of repre-
sentation. While the discipline has devoted considerable effort to exploring the effects that electoral
institutions have on representation (Huber and Powell, 1994; Powell, 2006), more recent scholarship
has called into question whether the focus on electoral systems as the key explanatory variable in
representation studies is justified (Golder and Stramski, 2010; Powell, 2009; Blais and Bodet, 2006).
In this vein, we suggest that the interplay between party and electoral incentives is an important
source of variation in representation over time. Therefore, our research suggests that a rigid char-
acterization of representation, based on system-level factors, may conceal meaningful variation in
representation across time within electoral systems.
Our empirical findings point to two related forms of dynamic partisanship in the U.S. House
— decreasing party loyalty among individual members and corresponding conflict avoidance in the
selection of roll call votes by majority parties as elections approach. As a result, parties in the U.S.
House start out with a high level of conflict at the beginning of the election cycle that dissipates
as elections near and the costs of partisan behavior rise. These findings directly contribute to
the important and growing literature on the linkages between elections and legislative voting (e.g.,
Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan, 2002; Ansolabehere, Snyder, Jr. and Stewart, III, 2001). At
the same time, we identify important policy implications of dynamic partisanship, showing that
partisan manipulation of bills via amendments steadily declines with proximity to elections. As
a result, bills that are introduced late in the election cycle are less likely to encounter partisan
revision than those introduced when elections are distant.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section places our study within the research on con-
gressional parties. In particular, we believe that the literature has overlooked an important form
of partisan variation — changes occurring between congressional elections. In the subsequent sec-
tion, we make the theoretical case for time-dependent variation in partisanship and derive testable
hypotheses. We then examine partisan behavior as a function of election proximity. The empirical
evidence shows that members are less likely to exhibit partisan behavior, and parties are less likely
to schedule votes that divide the parties, as elections approach. We proceed to explore the policy
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implications of these findings, before offering some concluding remarks.
1 Dynamic Partisanship
One of the central puzzles of legislative research is the varying role of parties in the U.S. Congress.
The influence and cohesion of congressional parties varies greatly over time (Cooper and Brady,
1981; Rohde, 1991; Theriault, 2008), across issues and vote types (Crespin, Rohde and Vander
Wielen, n.d.; Snyder, Jr. and Groseclose, 2000), and between members (Smith, 2007). In the U.S.,
changes in the prominence of parties over time have been attributed to variation in the internal
homogeneity of party members’ policy preferences and the level of disagreement across the parties
(Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich and Rohde, 2000). According to the conditional party gov-
ernment thesis, these conditions are said to have important implications for the influence of party
leaders in particular and the party organization in general (Rohde, 1991). Another perspective,
which emerged in response to criticism of the conditional party government framework (e.g., Kre-
hbiel, 1999), highlights legislators’ electoral incentives to cooperate with their party and to empower
party leaders (Cox and McCubbins, 2007, 2005; Lebo, McGlynn and Koger, 2007; Patty, 2008). By
this account, parties do not seek to maximize policy returns per se, but rather seek to advance the
electoral fortunes of their members by cultivating a favorable party “brand.”
Regardless of whether one conceptualizes parties as primarily legislative or electoral coalitions,
the prominent partisan accounts acknowledge the central importance of both policy and electoral
goals to members and parties alike (Finocchiaro and Rohde, 2008). Despite the well-documented
tension between policy and electoral goals (Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan, 2002; Carson et al.,
2010), in which the collective pursuit of these goals (via parties) may prove detrimental to their
realization at the individual level and vice versa, most studies do not examine the implications that
these potentially conflicting goals have for partisan behavior (but see Lebo, McGlynn and Koger,
2007). It is quite possible that, in addition to other catalysts of partisan change, partisan behavior
also reflects the strategic balancing of these goals over time. According to this logic, parties shift
emphasis from collective to individual goals and vice versa as a function of the comparative costs
of pursuing each of these goals at any given point in time, by which, crucially, we mean not just
across Congresses, but also within congressional terms. In the following paragraphs, we make the
(theoretical) case for studying changes in partisanship in a more explicitly dynamic fashion than
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previously explored in the existing literature. We believe that the role of parties in our theoretical
account of dynamic partisanship has wide applicability beyond the context of the U.S. Congress.
In particular, the need for parties to balance collective goals with electoral interests is relevant, for
example, for parties in the European Parliament (Lindsta¨dt, Slapin and Vander Wielen, 2011), as
well as for parties in other democratic systems (Carey, 2007, 2008).
[Figure 1 About Here.]
Before detailing the theoretical underpinnings of dynamic partisanship, we briefly present some
preliminary evidence that points to the importance of a dynamic account of partisanship. Figure
1(a) shows the conventional measure of party unity — the percent of votes in which a majority
of one party votes in opposition to a majority of the other party (hereafter referred to as “party
votes”) over two-year congressional terms (e.g., Cooper and Brady, 1981; Cox and McCubbins,
1991; Rohde, 1991). We then look at the differences in party unity scores between the first year
following a House election and the year preceding the next election [Figure 1(b)]. It is evident
from the comparison of these two figures that measuring party unity over two-year congressional
terms obscures important variation across time. Based on Figure 1(b), we conclude that there
is substantial and systematic change in party unity scores across years in election cycles. Figure
1(b) shows that scores in the first year tend to be considerably higher than in the second year,
and often the differences achieve statistical significance. In fact, the magnitude of change in party
unity across years in election cycles identified in Figure 1(b) often rivals that of the change across
Congresses identified in Figure 1(a). This pattern provides some initial support for the supposition
that partisanship is related to variable electoral demands within terms, and not just across them.
We argue that such variation in partisanship between elections is the product of both individual
and collective incentives. Member-level party support is likely to wane as elections approach due
to individual electoral motivations. Moreover, we also expect parties to reinforce this behavior by
strategically setting the agenda to accommodate their members’ concerns about casting difficult
votes when the electoral costs of doing so are highest.
As a first step toward explaining the time-dependent variation in legislative behavior, we begin
by considering the various constraints present in legislative decision-making. In particular, members
encounter multiple, potentially competing, forces in the pursuit of their goals (Maltzman, 1997).
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Foremost among these forces are voters, to whom individual members must appeal in order to gain
reelection. Political parties also play a central role in members’ decision-making by serving as the
collective units that (i) facilitate policy goals via repeated coordination (Aldrich, 1995; Schwartz,
1989) and (ii) forge reputations that provide members collective electoral benefits (Cox and Mc-
Cubbins, 2007). Moreover, party loyalty is also a key determinant of institutional advancement
(Coker and Crain, 1994), which further bolsters members’ legislative and electoral successes. As
noted earlier, despite these advantages to party support, there is compelling evidence that party
loyalty has damaging effects on electoral prospects at the level of the individual member (e.g.,
Carson et al., 2010). Thus, members are forced to strategically balance their levels of partisanship
across time so as to capitalize on the returns to partisan behavior without incurring the associated
electoral sanctions.
How members go about balancing these competing forces is logically related to the proposition
that electoral penalties for partisan behavior are dynamic. Specifically, a legislator’s cost for parti-
san behavior is likely to be higher when voters more closely monitor his or her legislative activities
(Lindsta¨dt and Vander Wielen, 2011). Generally speaking, monitoring by voters is imperfect due
to collective action problems, information costs, and memory decay (Bednar, 2006). However, elec-
tions increase the visibility of legislative behavior, which in turn facilitates monitoring by reducing
the costs associated with it (e.g., Kalt and Zupan, 1990). Therefore, we arrive at the assumption
that monitoring of legislative voting by voters increases as the time until the next election decreases.
This is a variation on the “What have you done for me lately?” principle identified by Shepsle,
Van Houweling, Abrams and Hanson (2009). Just as voters pay more attention and give more credit
to legislators for pork projects provided in close proximity to elections, they pay more attention
to legislative votes as elections draw near.1 Previous research has also shown that voters assign
greater weight to more recent votes when assessing a member’s performance (Weingast, Shepsle and
Johnsen, 1981). Accordingly, voters may not only recall recent legislative activity more easily, but
1While we do not further investigate the mechanism responsible for variation in monitoring,
we assume that the rise in voter attentiveness as elections approach results from such factors as
increased scrutiny from local media and efforts by challengers to draw attention to votes they
consider inconsistent with voter preferences.
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they might also consider recent votes a more reliable measure of a member’s future behavior than
more removed activity. While variation in legislative behavior that reflects a sensitivity to elections
has been documented in the Senate (e.g., Elling, 1982), comparatively little research of this variety
has studied the House because of the much shorter terms (but see Tien, 2001). Yet, we can study
this phenomenon in the House by moving away from the traditional focus on congressional terms
as the unit of analysis and towards a more refined temporal analysis. Furthermore, we suggest
that a complete picture of the balancing of competing demands must consider both individual and
collective behavior.
We also assume that some policy questions that come before Congress force individual mem-
bers to choose between the position that is most marketable to their constituents and the position
preferred by party leaders and party-connected donors/interest groups. There will be fewer such
votes for members whose districts have clear partisan tendencies that align with their party. How-
ever, even under such harmonious conditions, we would still expect cross-cleaving issues to arise
as parties struggle to pass (or block) major initiatives (e.g., health care reform in 2009–2010), to
enact legislation that is necessary but not popular (e.g., the stimulus package in 2009), to satisfy
major interest groups aligned with the party, or to follow through on intra-party log-rolls. Given
that voter monitoring fluctuates over time, the costs to legislators of party loyalty on divisive votes
such as these likewise vary.
Collectively, votes that generate inter-party disagreement confer benefits to political parties and
the majority party in particular. Not only are these votes the outgrowth of parties pursuing the
legislative goals of a majority of their members, but they also contribute to the parties’ collective
reputations. Specifically, candidates and parties reap some electoral benefits from providing voters
with clearly defined and distinctive policy positions (Hinich and Munger, 1989; Snyder, Jr. and
Groseclose, 2000).
Yet, research indicates that party voting is harmful to members’ individual electoral prospects
(Carson et al., 2010). Thus, as party leaders pursue the advancement of collective goals, they must
be sensitive to member-level constraints (Sinclair, 1998). In particular, party leaders, as agents of
the rank-and-file membership, must be judicious in soliciting legislative behavior that is contrary
to members’ electoral interests (Lebo, McGlynn and Koger, 2007). The majority party is likely
to incur electoral and/or legislative losses if its party leaders make excessive and indiscriminate
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requests for party support from rank-and-file members, not to mention the possibility that party
leaders will lose their coveted leadership posts. Thus, party leaders, like individual members, have
to balance competing forces by adopting a strategy that maximizes the gains from party support
while minimizing the member-level repercussions.2
In 2010, for instance, the Democratic leadership quite openly postponed consideration of an
inevitably contentious vote on extending the Bush tax cuts until after the election, in an effort
to protect party members from having to make a potentially unpopular decision with elections
right around the corner (Dixon and Cornwell, 2010). Instead, the issue was voted on soon after
the elections. Rep. Tom Price’s (R-GA) call for abandoning the lame-duck session (see quote
at the beginning of the paper) was in direct response to the Democratic leadership’s strategic
agenda-setting decisions with respect to the Bush tax cuts and other legislative initiatives. Price’s
comments reflect an awareness of the time-sensitivity of legislative decisions (relative to elections).
In the next section, we explore the above theoretical arguments in a decision-theoretic framework.
The models we develop allow us to clearly identify the mechanisms driving variation in partisanship
and to generate empirically testable hypotheses.
2 A Theoretical Model of Dynamic Partisanship
By our theoretical account, we suggest that at the level of the individual member, voter monitoring
is the principle motivating force in dynamic partisanship.3 Specifically, for our theoretical model
2We suggest that any benefits the minority party receives from the strategic adjustment of the
agenda are merely a by-product of the considerations made by the majority party regarding its
own constraints. After all, the majority party stands more to lose than the minority party both
in terms of seats and institutional advantages by engaging in electorally risky behavior. Moreover,
voters tend to penalize the majority party more severely for what they perceive to be unfavorable
legislative activity (Jones and McDermott, 2009). Thus, the comparative electoral benefits of a
more consensual agenda as elections approach would appear far greater for the majority party than
the minority party.
3We suppress the mathematics of the member-level decision-theoretic model due to its conceptual
simplicity (available upon request).
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we assume that the legislative returns to party support are relatively constant across time (i.e., the
differential benefit of the preferred outcome on analogous votes is the same at time t as time t+ 1).
However, since there is theoretical reason to suspect that voter attentiveness is functionally related
to time (see previous section), the electoral consequences of party support are not time-invariant
(for a related model, see Lindsta¨dt and Vander Wielen, 2011). Therefore, we expect member-level
party support to be inversely related to voter monitoring. While the precise functional form of
voter monitoring is not known, it is theoretically plausible that voter attentiveness is increasing
in election proximity (Gelman and King, 1993). We note that this model permits the member’s
electoral circumstances to affect the specific levels of party support across time, with electoral
vulnerability suppressing the baseline of predicted party support. That said, the general functional
form of support remains determined by the voter monitoring function. Consequently, we would
expect members to offer less party support as elections approach.
Party Support Proposition: As the time to election decreases, legislators will be less
likely to side with their party on votes that divide the parties.
Equation 1 represents the majority party’s utility function, which we use to derive the optimal
level of partisan division across time. Let d ∈ R+ measure partisan divisiveness on a given bill. As
discussed in detail above, voters respond negatively to overtly partisan behavior, and thus there is
a direct adverse effect of partisan division. We denote this direct (negative) electoral effect by the
coefficient d ∈ R+. Note that since the direct electoral effect of divisiveness penalizes expected
utility, the term interacting d [i.e., −dmp(T )] is negatively signed. Conversely, the majority party
reaps gains in utility from partisan division, since votes that divide the parties are the outgrowth of
legislative proposals that exhibit partisan advantage. These legislative accomplishments indirectly
contribute to electoral success (Cox and McCubbins, 2007; Hinich and Munger, 1989), and advance
the policy goals of the majority party. We denote the indirect (positive) electoral effect of partisan
division stemming from legislative successes by the coefficient l ∈ R+. Finally, we denote the
(positive) effect of partisan division on policy (i.e., non-electoral) goals by the coefficient λ ∈ R+.
If one conceptualizes the policy returns to partisan division in a spatial context, then λ can be
treated as a function of chamber preference arrangements.
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E(u) = −dmp(T )d + dmp(T )l + dλ (1)
We account for variation in voter monitoring by incorporating the probability function p ∈ [0, 1]
of duration (in days) to the next election T ∈ [1, 2, . . . , 730]. That is, p identifies the probability
that voters are monitoring legislative behavior at a given time in the election cycle. We expect
that p is a weakly monotonically decreasing function of duration until election, such that voters
become increasingly attentive to legislative behavior as the number of days to election decreases.
The probability function is interacted with the election-specific components of the utility function
since electoral rewards (l) and sanctions (d) are dependent on voter attentiveness.
Note that we permit the partisan divisiveness parameter, d, to be raised to an arbitrary ex-
ponent, m ∈ (1,∞), on the election-specific components of the utility function to provide for the
possibility that voter responses to marginal changes in divisiveness are not constant. The divisive-
ness term for the policy-specific component (dλ) does not have an exponent, since we assume that
the legislative return to divisiveness yields linear returns at the rate determined by λ. Divisiveness,
in this context, can be conceptualized as a measure of the spatial proximity of the policy proposal.
We also assume, quite innocuously, that d > l, since we anticipate that the direct electoral costs
of divisiveness will outweigh the indirect electoral benefits that emerge from legislative successes.
This is consistent with the extant literature that finds that divisiveness has harmful consequences
for electoral success. If this assumption is not met, then the electoral cost-benefit structure of the
utility function would not reflect these results.
While the utility function includes a number of parameters, this should not distract from the
fact that, in essence, the function simply reflects the weighting by parties of the benefits and costs
of partisanship. In particular, for purposes of illustration only, assume that m = 1 (implying a
constant effect of divisiveness) and p(T ) = 1 (implying that voter monitoring is a certainty). Then
the right-hand side of Equation 1 can be reduced to d(l +λ− d), which is just the sum of benefits
(l + λ) and costs (d) to partisanship weighted by the level of divisiveness (d). According to our
model, parties choose the level of divisiveness to maximize (minimize) the net benefits (costs) at
any point in time, while considering the likelihood of voter monitoring.
We next derive the optimal level of divisiveness across time by differentiating Equation 1 with
respect to d, setting the result equal to zero, and solving for d. The optimal level of divisiveness,
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denoted d∗, is given in Equation 2.
d∗ =
λ
p(T )m(d − l)
1
m−1
(2)
The central, and intuitive, result of this solution is that the optimal level of divisiveness falls as
elections approach. This result holds for any model specification meeting the above requirements.
Figure 2 illustrates the variation in d∗ with time to next election. Therefore, we expect the majority
party to adjust the agenda across time such that fewer divisive proposals are considered as elections
approach.
Agenda Setting Proposition: As elections approach, majority party leaders will be less
likely to schedule proposals that divide the parties.
[Figure 2 About Here.]
An interesting secondary result of the model is that d∗ exhibits hyperbolic behavior across time.
This suggests that there is a rapid decrease in optimal divisiveness over the earliest changes in time
during the election cycle, followed by substantially diminishing marginal change (see Figure 2). Of
course, the slope [controlled by m and p(T )] and intercept (controlled by all other parameters) of
the hyperbola are affected by the input values, although the general hyperbolic functional form is
impressively robust. We note that most reasonable specifications on m and p(T ) result in consid-
erable flattening out of the curve at approximately one year from election. In the next section, we
discuss the empirical models we use to test our theoretical propositions.
3 Data and Methods
We examine temporal variation in House members’ support for their party, and search for evidence
of corresponding agenda-setting adjustments made by House majorities between the 84th and 108th
Congresses (1955–2004). In the following subsection, we address the member-level effects, before
turning our attention to the agenda-setting effects in the subsequent subsection.
3.1 Member-level Analysis
As a first step, we explore whether members modify their party support on divisive votes according
to election proximity. In particular, we test for variation in party support that reflects an awareness
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of the collective benefits and electoral costs of party loyalty. Our focus is on roll call votes in
which a majority of one party votes in opposition to a majority of the other party (i.e., party
votes). Party votes are widely used as the basis for various measures of congressional partisanship
(e.g., party unity scores). Unlike other votes, they establish discernible and conflicting party
positions. Given that party votes generate party divisions, signifying core party differences [i.e.,
issues motivating party coalescence] (Poole and Rosenthal, 2007), the outcomes of these votes
have meaningful implications for the parties’ collective reputations. For both policy and electoral
reasons, party leaders have an incentive to exert greater pressure on rank-and-file members on these
votes than less divisive ones. Yet, we also know that party votes heavily influence voters’ appraisal
of members’ party loyalty, and increasing aggregate party support on these votes has been shown
to negatively affect members’ electoral prospects (Carson et al., 2010).
Therefore, members’ voting behavior on party votes offers valuable insight into the balance that
members strike between competing collective (i.e., party) and individual (i.e., constituent) demands
over the course of an election cycle. To explore temporal variation in party support, we first isolate
all party votes during the period of analysis (n = 9, 867).4 We then construct our dependent
variable by identifying whether members voted with or against the majority of their party on these
votes, coding party support as 1 and defection as 0.5 For the purpose of this study, a particular
advantage of examining party support on party votes is that it allows us to study variation in
voting behavior while minimizing the effects of agenda change. That is, this design models the
probability of party support given the occurrence of a party vote. Therefore, fluctuations in party
votes across a term, which may be a function of both variation in the party support and agenda-
setting considerations, do not affect our inferences. If, for example, parties pursue fewer party
votes as election approach, as we predict, then considering all votes in the member-level analysis of
party support would inevitably suggest a greater decline in party support than can be reasonably
attributed to member-level effects. In addition, measuring party voting in this fashion, as opposed
4We use the roll call data made available on Keith Poole’s Voteview website (at
http://voteview.com/).
5We code absences and other unrecorded activity as missing data, since we cannot definitively
determine party support.
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to, say, aggregating party support on party votes over time periods within the congressional term,
allows us to conduct a more refined analysis of the effects of proximity to election.
The key independent variable(s) throughout this and later stages of the analysis are polynomial
terms for the duration of time (measured in days) between the vote and the next election.6 Jointly,
these variables provide information regarding the extent to which party support varies with election
proximity. To better understand the functional relationship between party support and the timing
of votes, we must determine the order of the polynomial for days until election that best fits the
data. We do so by using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to assess whether successive
increases in the polynomial order improve the fit of the model.7 We note that, despite using the
same evaluation process across all models, the optimal order of the time polynomial will vary across
models due to differences in the underlying data structure.
We also include a number of control variables that account for differences in members’ levels
of electoral insulation/vulnerability. The variable Retirement identifies members who decided to
retire during the Congress of interest. When members decide to retire, they sever both electoral
and partisan connections, which may have previously compelled them to behave differently than
they do in the absence of such constraints (Rothenberg and Sanders, 2000).
In addition, we include a variable to tap members’ ideological extremism (Ideological Extrem-
ism), operationalized as the absolute value of their first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score (Poole
and Rosenthal, 2007). The variable accounts for the different policy costs that members incur
in voting with their party on divisive votes. Since the first dimension is most closely associated
with inter-party conflict, it effectively captures how (in)consistent a member’s (potentially induced)
preferences are with the center of her party on measures that divide the parties. Members situated
near the center of the policy continuum have preferences that are at odds with the majority of his
or her fellow partisans. Conversely, we would expect ideological extremists to have fewer electoral
constraints associated with party voting, given the natural congruence that exists between their
6We used Poole’s Voteview codebooks to collect the dates on which votes occurred, and relied
on the House Clerk’s website (at http://clerk.house.gov) to determine the dates of elections.
7We also use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and likelihood ratio tests to confirm the
model selections based on the AIC.
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policy preferences and their party’s policy positions.
The variable Seniority measures a member’s chamber seniority and accounts for the possibility
that members accrue greater electoral insulation with service. We also include a number of variables
that capture the competitiveness of a member’s previous election. Lagged Vote Share measures the
incumbent’s percentage share of the two-party vote received in the previous election. Lagged Quality
Challenger is a dichotomous measure indicating whether the incumbent faced a quality challenger
— defined as a candidate who has held previous elective office (Jacobson, 1989) — in the previous
election. Lagged Spending Gap is measured as the natural logarithm of challenger expenditures less
the natural logarithm of incumbent expenditures.8
Lagged District Partisanship is measured as the share of the two-party vote that the presidential
candidate belonging to the member’s party received in his or her congressional district in the
previous presidential election. This is an often used measure of district partisanship (see e.g.
Ansolabehere, Snyder, Jr. and Stewart, III, 2001; Carson et al., 2010). While voters broadly
oppose overtly partisan behavior, we account for district partisanship since some legislators are
surely more susceptible to reprisal than others. We also include an indicator variable, termed In-
party Midterm, that accounts for membership in the president’s party in midterm elections cycles.
This captures any adjustments in partisan behavior that in-party members make in anticipation of
the well-documented midterm loss (Bafumi, Erikson and Wlezien, 2010). Each of these member-
level variables can be considered a signal to members regarding their relative electoral security.
In one of the member-level models reported below, we use a composite factor score of these
measures, termed Member-level Characteristics (Factor Score), instead of including each of the
individual variables. Increasing values of this measure represent increasing electoral insulation.9
8Use of the natural logarithm captures the nonlinear relationship between money and votes
identified by Jacobson (1980). Spending data are not available for the period preceding 1978.
Excluding this variable from the analysis, however, does not substantively affect the results.
9Specifically, the composite score has a strong positive relationship to Ideological Extremism, Se-
niority, Lagged Vote Share, and Lagged District Partisanship, and a strong negative relationship to
Lagged Quality Challenger and Lagged Spending Gap. The composite score exhibits a considerably
weaker (positive) relationship to both Retirement and In-party Midterm.
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To explore whether electoral vulnerability enhances the effect of time on the probability of casting
a party vote, we interact the composite factor score with the polynomial terms of time. This
approach provides for more easily interpretable results, since it significantly reduces the number
of interaction terms needed (i.e., we avoid having to interact every member-level measure with the
three polynomial terms of time).10
Since one might suspect that party adjustments of the agenda that are consistent with our
expectations could affect our measurement of member-level behavior, we include additional controls
to account for variation in the agenda. In other words, if parties, as hypothesized, schedule more
consensual votes as elections approach, then it is conceivable that we might observe declining party
support on party votes as a result of the type of votes being considered. While we account for
agenda change by exclusively considering party votes, it is nevertheless possible that a model that
fails to fully control for the agenda could overstate a decline in member support. Using observed
voting divisions to control for variation in the divisiveness of the agenda would, by definition,
obscure the effect we seek to examine.
Instead, we know that some types of votes are more likely than others to generate inter-party
disagreement. Suspension of the rules, for instance, requires two-thirds support for passage, which
is why these votes tend to occur on measures that are relatively non-controversial. We include
dummy variables (Vote Type Fixed Effects) for the six vote type categories (minus a reference
category) introduced by Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (n.d.). The vote type categories
include regular passage of bills, passage under suspension of the rules, miscellaneous passage (final
passage of measures that do not require the president’s signature), amendments, partisan procedural
votes (e.g., special rules and motions to recommit), and miscellaneous procedural votes (see the
appendix for additional information on the vote categories). Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen
(n.d.) show that these categories are substantially related to levels of observed inter-party conflict.
By controlling for vote type, as opposed to controlling for observed voting behavior, we employ a
measure of inter-party conflict in the agenda that still permits us to analyze variation in the behavior
10We estimate numerous models with a wide variety of control variables, lagging schemes, and
interactions with the polynomial terms of time, and find that the following results are highly robust
to their selection.
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of interest. Moreover, it has also been shown that variation in party cohesion is related to changes
in the issue content of the agenda (Lee, 2008), and so we likewise include dummy variables (Issue
Type Fixed Effects) for the 19 major topic categories identified by the Policy Agendas Project.11
Finally, we include dummy variables for Congresses (Congress Fixed Effects). These fixed
effects are designed to capture any systematic differences in partisan behavior that might be due to
circumstances specific to particular Congresses.12 An additional advantage of including Congress
fixed effects is the ability to explore whether legislative behavior has systematically changed over
the period of analysis.
We estimate the probit model of member i’s party support on vote v, shown in Equation 3, both
with and without control variables, where α is the intercept term, x denotes the vector of control
variables for member i (with corresponding vector of coefficients, β) and z the control variables
for vote v (with corresponding vector of coefficients, γ).13 The model corrects the standard errors
for clustering, which is necessary due to the presence of repeated measurements (i.e., individual
members occur multiple times in the data set).14 The benefit of the staged inclusion of the control
variables is that we can observe any changes in the marginal effects of the polynomial terms that
11The data used for coding issue types were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and
Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation (NSF) grant numbers SBR
9320922 and 0111611. We note that alternatively using the issue type categories identified in the
Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) data produces substantively similar results.
12Using fixed effects for election cycles, rather than Congresses, produces substantively similar
results. We believe that there is strong theoretical rationale for accounting for Congresses, since
doing so captures variation in both membership and partisan structures.
13We find evidence that the probit link offers subtle improvements in model fit compared to the
logit link for some of the member-level models, whereas the reverse is true for the agenda setting
models. For both sets of models, either specification of the link function arrives at substantively
similar results.
14Due to the size of the data matrix, we are unable to estimate a hierarchical model for the entire
data set to account for repeated measures. However, we estimated a hierarchical model for samples
of the data, and arrived at substantively similar results to those below.
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occur when accounting for additional factors. Note that for this model the cubic function of time
(DaysToElection in Equation 3) best fits the data. The second- and third-degree polynomial terms
of DaysToElection allow for non-linear effects of time (the corresponding coefficients are ζ2 and
ζ3, respectively), and are again included because model selection criteria dictate this specification.
In line with our theoretical proposition, we expect the polynomial terms to collectively produce
increasing probabilities of party support with distance from election. While this can occur in a
number of ways, should the polynomial exhibit alternating signs, then the result most consistent
with this supposition is one in which the first- and third-degree terms are positive (ζ1 and ζ3,
respectively) and the second-degree term is negative (ζ2). We also include Congress fixed effects
in each of the member-level models reported below (i.e., dummy variables for Congresses). The
vector of coefficients for the Congress fixed effects is denoted as ξ in Equation 3.
Pr(PartySupporti,v = 1) = Φ
(
α+
3∑
k=1
ζkDaysToElectionkv + β
′xi + γ ′zv + ξ′Congress
)
(3)
Since we find evidence of systematic changes in party support related to election proximity
(results discussed below), the next step in the empirical analysis is to investigate whether majority
parties structure the agenda by scheduling divisive (consensual) votes when members are most
(least) insulated from the negative electoral effects of partisan behavior.
3.2 Agenda Setting Analysis
Next, we explore the proposition that the occurrence of divisive votes and the distance from elections
are positively related. To study this question, we examine all House votes during the period of
analysis (n = 20, 450).15 We begin by exploring the timing of both divisive and consensual votes.
The dependent variable for one model is a dichotomous measure of whether a vote generated party
voting. This is a natural extension of our analysis of members’ party support, since the above
analysis examines voting behavior on party votes but not the timing of these votes (by design).
For a separate model, we construct a dichotomous dependent variable measuring whether a vote
resulted in at least 90% of the membership voting in the same fashion (hereafter referred to as
15We use the Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) roll call database (at
http://www.poli.duke.edu/pipc/data.html).
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“ultra-consensual” votes). We would expect to see a decreasing probability of party votes and
increasing probability of ultra-consensual votes as elections approach. As an additional gauge
of changes in inter-party division relative to elections, we also examine trends in the differences
across parties’ vote distributions (hereafter referred to as the “disagreement score”). We measure
the disagreement score as the absolute difference in the proportion of participating Democrats and
Republicans voting “yea,” where values approaching 1 indicate increasing inter-party disagreement.
If majority parties schedule divisive votes according to election proximity, then we should find that
the disagreement score decreases as elections approach.
The key independent variables for each of these models are the polynomial terms for the duration
of time (again measured in days) between the vote and the next election. The order of polynomial
is determined using the model selection process described above. We find that the models of party
and ultra-consensual votes are best fit using a quadratic function of time, and the model for the
disagreement score with a cubic function. Since we cannot expect every vote to generate equivalent
inter-party divisions, we again include control variables for the vote type categories introduced by
Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (n.d.). In a separate model, we also include issue type fixed
effects, which further account for differences across votes in terms of their propensity to produce
inter-party disagreement.
We might also anticipate some variation in the occurrence of divisive/consensual votes on the
basis of the preference composition of party members. For one, we would expect partisan disagree-
ment to rise naturally with increasing party polarization. In addition, it has been argued elsewhere
that central party leaders serve to mitigate collective action problems (Cooper and Brady, 1981;
Binder, 1997; Sinclair, 1998; Cox and McCubbins, 2005), and the extent to which party leaders pur-
sue collective gains is a function of the authority extended to them by the rank-and-file membership
(Rohde, 1991). An increasingly authoritative central leadership is expected to more aggressively
pursue collective partisan goals. The conditional party government thesis suggests that central
party leaders are granted broader lincence by rank-and-file members to pursue partisan outcomes
as the two legislative parties become increasingly polarized [i.e., as intra-party homogeneity and
inter-party distance increase] (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich and Rohde, 2000).
Therefore, it is important that we account for the preference distribution of partisans as we
examine variation in the scheduling of divisive/consensual votes. We estimate a separate model
17
including the measure of polarization introduced by Vander Wielen and Smith (2011), which is
shown in Equation 4. This single measure accounts for the polarization conditions articulated
by Rohde (1991), while avoiding collinearity between the separate components during the period
of analysis. This measure of polarization increases with distance between party medians and as
standard deviations for the parties get smaller, all else equal. Stated differently, the greater the
distance between the minority and majority party medians and the more intra-party ideological
coherence the majority and minority party exhibit, the greater the value of the polarization measure
will be. We measure the input variables (i.e., party medians and standard deviations) using first-
dimension DW-NOMINATE scores.16
|Party MedianMajority − Party MedianMinority|√(
σ2Majority + σ
2
Minority
)
/2
(4)
Equations 5 and 6 show the models for this step of the analysis, where x denotes the vector
of control variables for vote i (with corresponding vector of coefficients, β). Since the party and
ultra-consensual vote models have the same specifications, we present them in the same equation
(Equation 5), where y denotes the occurrence of the operative votes. Following from our theoretical
proposition, as the duration of time until the next election decreases, we expect the likelihood of
party votes to decrease, the likelihood of ultra-consensual votes to increase, and the disagreement
score to decline.
16We note that this measure of polarization varies across, and not within, Congresses. This
measure captures important across-Congress variation in the party preferences that theoretically
affects agenda-setting strategies. While members’ observed policy positions may strategically vary
across time, it is exceedingly unlikely that their preferences would systematically vary according to
elections. Therefore, we use first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, which are based on a scaling
technique that accounts for all recorded votes, to capture member preferences and polarization at
the Congress level. Clearly, some of the strategic decisions theorized about could affect members’
scores at the margins. However, we are confident that these scores offer a reasonable basis for
assessing Congress-by-Congress variation in polarization.
18
Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1
(
αj[i] +
2∑
k=1
ζj[i]kDaysToElection
k
i + β
′xi
)
(5)
αj ∼ N(µα, σ2congress)
βj ∼ N(µβ, σ2β)
DisagreementScore = αj[i] +
3∑
k=1
ζj[i]kDaysToElection
k
i + β
′xi (6)
αj ∼ N(µα, σ2congress)
βj ∼ N(µβ, σ2β)
Given the hierarchical nature of the data, with votes nested within Congresses, we estimate
hierarchical logit models for the analysis of party and ultra-consensual votes, and a hierarchical
linear model for the analysis of disagreement scores. Two alternative estimation strategies to using
hierarchical models include estimating standard logit and linear models with Congress fixed effects
(i.e., dummy variables for Congresses), or standard models without Congress fixed effects. Models
with a fixed effects structure make the assumption of no pooling, while models without fixed effects
assume complete pooling (Gelman and Hill, 2007). Stated differently, inclusion of Congress fixed
effects assumes that Congresses do not share any common characteristics (hence, no pooling), while
exclusion of Congress fixed effects implies that there are no differences across Congresses, such that
all votes can be treated as if they come from the same Congress (hence, complete pooling). Both of
these assumptions are not only very strong ones, but are also likely to be unrealistic. Conversely,
hierarchical models offer a compromise of partial pooling, where the level of similarity (difference)
across Congresses is not assumed but estimated as part of the model. In fact, the model will yield
an estimate of a so-called random intercept for Congresses with a corresponding standard deviation.
The greater the standard deviation on that random intercept, the greater the differences in agenda
setting across Congresses.
In particular, we group on Congresses in the hierarchical models to account for changes in the
agenda that result from variation in the composition of the membership across time.17 In each case,
17As an alternative, we also grouped votes on election cycles — the votes occurring between
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we include random intercepts to permit different baseline effects across Congresses (αj[i] in Equa-
tions 5 and 6). We also account for differences across Congresses in the effect of election proximity
on the probability of observing a particular vote type by including random slope coefficients for
the polynomial terms of time (ζj[i]k in Equations 5 and 6). By including random slope coefficients,
we allow for the possibility that the effect of time on, for example, the probability of a party vote
is not the same in each Congress. As with the random intercept term on Congresses, there is no
a priori assumption about the similarities (differences) across Congresses, but rather the random
slope coefficient and its corresponding standard deviation will tell us how much variation there is in
the effect of time on agenda setting across Congresses. We include only those random slope terms
that improve the fit of the model, using the aforementioned model specification approach.18 The
random intercept and slope coefficients are distributed normally with unknown mean and variance.
Since Equations 5 and 6 examine observed voting divisions, temporal variation in party sup-
port surely influences the timing of inter-party disagreement. For instance, a sufficient decrease
(increase) in members’ party support consistent with expectations could produce a corresponding
decrease (increase) in the occurrence of party votes under conditions of a static agenda. Therefore,
we take the additional step of examining the timing of votes that we have a priori reason to believe
are systematically divisive/consensual. This extension avoids reliance on vote outcomes, which are
affected by members’ party support, for uncovering strategic manipulation of the agenda. We know
that certain votes are predisposed to high/low levels of inter-party disagreement. That is, some
votes systematically occur on matters of high/low inter-party conflict. For instance, amendments
are more likely to expose partisan conflict over the content of the bill than final passage votes
that offer a choice between the bill and the status quo (Roberts and Smith, 2003). Furthermore,
elections — as opposed to Congresses, and found substantively similar results. This is not entirely
surprising considering that the variables that categorize votes according to Congress and election
cycle correlate at 0.9998. Since Congresses capture the bulk of the duration effects, as evidenced by
the correlation with election cycles, and avoid (potentially sizeable) incongruities in membership,
we believe there is strong theoretical rationale for grouping on Congresses.
18We note that the models are highly robust to alternative specifications of both fixed and random
effects.
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evidence suggests that party leaders strategically consider the implications that vote types have for
inter-party disagreement (Finocchiaro and Rohde, 2008).
We study the occurrence of four vote types that have clearly identifiable associations with inter-
party conflict — regular passage votes, suspensions, amendments, and partisan procedural votes.19
Both regular passage and suspension votes customarily occur on measures that are relatively non-
controversial, whereas amendment and partisan procedural votes occur on more divisive measures
(Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen, n.d.). We examine whether the occurrence of these votes
systematically varies over the course of election cycles. For that purpose, we estimate a hierarchical
logit model for each of the vote categories, in which the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure
of whether the vote is of the vote category of interest. As with earlier models, the key independent
variables are the polynomial terms of the number of days until the next election. We also estimate
separate models including the polarization measure. We again include random intercept coefficients
and random slope coefficients for the polynomial terms of time. The order of the polynomial of time
and the random components are determined using the model fit specifications discussed above.
Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1
(
αj[i] +
K∑
k=1
ζj[i]kDaysToElection
k
i + β Polarizationi
)
(7)
αj ∼ N(µα, σ2congress)
βj ∼ N(µβ, σ2β)
The notation for the models is shown in Equation 7, where K = 1 for the regular passage
and partisan procedural models and K = 2 for the other vote types. If majority parties strate-
gically adjust the agenda, as suggested by our theoretical proposition, then we should see more
regular passage votes and suspensions and fewer amendments and partisan procedural votes as
elections approach. Such a finding would constitute additional evidence that majorities schedule
more consensual votes in response to members’ electoral constraints.
19The miscellaneous categories are omitted from this analysis since they offer less conclusive
predictions for partisan divisions.
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4 Results
We begin our discussion of the results in the following subsection by interpreting the member-level
effects. At the end of the discussion of the various member-level models, we use these results to
make a case for why member-level effects are only part of the dynamic partisanship story. The
subsequent subsection is devoted to the discussion of the agenda-setting effects.
4.1 Evidence for Dynamic Partisan Behavior
We begin by reviewing the results for the proposition that members exhibit less party support as
elections approach (Party Support Proposition). Table 1 shows the results for the model shown in
Equation 3 both with and without member- and vote-specific control variables included.20 Notably,
in these estimations we find that all of the coefficients for the polynomial terms are statistically
significant, with the first and third degrees having positive signs. This finding points to a trend of
an increasing probability of party support as the number of days to election increases. Moreover,
the magnitudes of the coefficients are impressively consistent across the estimations, implying that
the effects are robust to the inclusion of myriad controls.
[Table 1 About Here.]
As expected, we also find a strong, positive effect of Ideological Extremism (Models 2 and 3).
Namely, members whose preferences are more aligned with their party’s position (i.e., members who
are located away from the center of the ideological continuum) exhibit a higher probability of party
support, as predicted. We also find a positive and statistically significant effect of Lagged Quality
Challenger on party voting (Models 2 and 3), indicating that members who face quality challengers
are more likely to vote with their party on divisive votes. This finding does not lend itself to an
unambiguous interpretation. It is conceivable that members who faced a quality challenger in the
previous election relied heavily upon the assistance of the party to win reelection, and thus feel
compelled to subsequently support their party on legislative votes. We are, however, reluctant
20As a robustness check, we also estimate each of the models in our analysis excluding those
votes taking place during the lame-duck sessions. The results we report below are not substantively
changed by excluding lame-duck votes.
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to draw such a conclusion, especially considering that the Lagged Quality Challenger variable is
highly correlated with other member-level variables. In fact, this variable assumes the predicted
(negative) sign when excluding other member-level variables from Models 2 and 3. The negative and
statistically significant effect of In-party Midterm Election (Models 2 and 3) has a straightforward
interpretation: members of the president’s party are less likely to support their party in a midterm
election cycle. This is an intuitive result, suggesting that members attempt to escape the midterm
decline by exhibiting greater party independence. The effects on both Ideological Extremism and
In-party Midterm Election are highly robust.
The other member-specific control variables are not statistically significant when correcting the
standard errors for clustering.21 Model 4 in Table 1 builds on Model 3 and replaces the various
member-level variables with a single composite factor score. In addition, we include interaction
terms between the factor score and the polynomial terms of time to investigate the possibility that
the slope is dependent on electoral insulation. Stated differently, it is conceivable that the effect of
time on party voting is functionally dependent on a member’s electoral circumstances. As indicated
by the interaction terms failing to achieve statistical significance, there is no such variation in the
effect of time across levels of electoral insulation. However, the composite factor score on its own is
positive and statistically significant. Since higher values indicate greater electoral insulation, this
finding, quite intuitively, suggests that more secure members are afforded greater liberty to support
their party on party votes. This finding confirms our supposition that a member’s predisposition
toward party support is contingent on his or her electoral circumstances.
To facilitate interpretation of the central findings, we simulate the 95% confidence intervals for
the probability of party support on party votes across the two-year election cycle for the models
in Table 1 (see Figure 3).22 Panel (a) shows a member’s predicted probability of supporting his
or her party on a party vote by the number of days to the next election for Model 1 holding all
21Each of the member-specific control variables is statistically significant in models that do not
account for clustering on individual members. This suggests that intra-cluster correlation in errors
is driving the statistical effects on the control variables in the uncorrected models.
22These simulations, and others, are conducted using the Zelig package (Imai, King and Lau,
2008) in R (R Development Core Team, 2012).
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variables at their mean, Panel (b) shows the predicted probability for Model 2 holding all variables
at their mean, Panel (c) shows the predicted probabilities for Model 3 for the Congresses with the
highest (103d Congress) and lowest (96th Congress) predicted baseline party support holding all
other variables at their mean, and Panel (d) shows the predicted probabilities for Model 4 for the
99th percentile of the factor score (“insulated member”) and the 1st percentile of the factor score
(“vulnerable member”) holding all other variables at their mean.
We find an appreciable drop in members’ probability of supporting their party on divisive votes
with proximity to election across each of the models. For Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 [Panels (a) and
(b) in Figure 3, respectively], the average member is expected to decrease his or her party support
by approximately 9 percentage points over the course of the election cycle. There is discernible
variation in baseline party support across both Congresses and levels of electoral insulation [see
Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 3, respectively]. Given that the predicted probabilities generated
by the models are non-linear (i.e., logistic function), variation in the baseline party support also
affects the rate of change in party support across time. For instance, the predicted probabilities
of party support for an average member in the Congress with the highest baseline party support
(103d Congress) vary from approximately 0.947 when elections are most distant to 0.892 when
they are most proximate. We compare this to the Congress with the lowest baseline party support
(96th Congress), in which the analogous predicted probabilities are 0.92 and 0.846, respectively
[see Panel (c)].23 For an insulated member (measured as the 99th percentile of the factor score),
the mean predicted probabilities of party support vary from 0.965 to 0.924 over the course of the
election cycle, whereas the mean predicted probabilities for a vulnerable member (measured as the
1st percentile of the factor score) likewise vary from 0.849 to 0.743 [see Panel (d)]. In each of the
models, the functional form of the relationship between party support and proximity to election
suggests that party support is characterized by an equilibrium level that is interrupted by low levels
23We do not find a systematic increase/decrease in the baseline party support across successive
Congresses during the period of analysis. This is confirmed by including a trend term in the models,
which fails to achieve statistical significance. However, as a reminder, we do find that baseline party
support among members of the president’s party is substantially depressed in midterm election
cycles.
24
when elections are proximate and high levels when elections are distant.
This seems to us to be a rather plausible functional form to characterize variation in party
support across time. Of course, some of the variation in the predicted probabilities can be attributed
to the curve fitting exercise, in which we find evidence that a cubic polynomial offers the best fit
for the data. Nonetheless, this result appears generally consistent with the conjecture that partisan
behavior is inversely related to voter monitoring, broadly construed. Specifically, the most rapid
reduction in party support occurs over the first year of the election cycle, with additional reductions
occurring shortly before the subsequent election. Arguably, this trend follows the attentiveness of
the most politically astute (e.g., organized interests, etc.) in the earliest stages of the election cycle
and the less politically engaged in the latter stages. In fact, it has been shown elsewhere that House
incumbents invite challenges from experienced politicians when they lend excessive party support
in the first session of a term (Carson, 2005). Thus, it is not entirely surprising that members temper
their party support over the first year of the election cycle in such a fashion. Moreover, the decline
in members’ party support when elections are proximate surely reflects the disproportionate level
of voter attentiveness that occurs immediately before an election (Gelman and King, 1993).24
[Figure 3 About Here.]
These findings offer robust evidence in favor of the Party Support Proposition. We observe a
considerable decline in members’ support for their party on contested votes as elections approach.
Therefore, members exhibit behavior that reflects the strategic balancing of collective and individual
considerations — they seek collective returns when individual electoral demands are minimal and
curtail their partisan support as elections approach.
To further explore the member-level effects identified in the above analysis, and to more directly
account for alternative explanations, we examine only those votes occurring during the period
24As indicated by the formalization of the majority party’s utility function in Equation 1, we do
not necessarily contend that an agenda-setting response by the majority party to this behavior is
the result of concern for the size of its legislative coalition, although there may be circumstances in
which this is the case. Rather, we suggest that party leaders make scheduling decisions primarily
to maximize collective gains and minimize the damaging electoral consequences that individual
members face.
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extending from two months preceding an election to the end of a Congress. We select this period
because it provides a limited and approximately equal amount of time before and after an election
within a given Congress.25 Because this approach examines only those votes occurring at the end
of a Congress, we can better account for alternative explanations that might attribute the model
results to changes in membership and/or end-of-Congress effects. It could be argued, for instance,
that the observed variation in party support is a function of changes in the underlying distribution
of preferences — the pivotal politics hypothesis (Krehbiel, 1998). Moreover, it is conceivable that
the diminishing party support as elections approach is an artifact of legislators making concessions
in an effort to advance legislation before the end of the Congress — the end-of-Congress hypothesis.
If these explanations are driving our results, then we would expect the likelihood of party support
on post-election votes to be either statistically indiscernible from (pivotal politics hypothesis) or
perhaps even lower than (end-of-Congress hypothesis) pre-election votes.
We note that the above analysis attempts to account for these alternative explanations by (i)
measuring days relative to elections and not the end of Congress, such that the beginning of an
election cycle involves the same members as the end of the previous election cycle, and (ii) we
consider only those bills that are already party votes, so that agenda-setting effects (e.g., possible
reductions in divisive votes as election approach) do not contaminate our results. Nonetheless,
we believe that this extension is a valuable validity check on our central findings. We replicate
the above models, using a dummy variable measuring whether the given vote occurred prior to or
after the election. We use this measure in lieu of the polynomial terms of time, since the period
of analysis does not provide sufficient variation in the number of days to election. For each of the
models, we find that members exhibit a statistically significant increase in party support following
election (results available upon request).26
25Reasonable adjustment to the periods of time before and after an election yield substantively
similar results.
26To further explore the pivotal politics hypothesis, we estimate the models using the 104th
Congress (1995-96) as the omitted category (i.e., baseline). Under certain assumptions on prefer-
ences and status quo locations, the pivotal politics thesis might predict greater party disagreement
following a change in party control, since the newly elected majority pursues policy matters lo-
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Our finding that more electorally vulnerable members exhibit a lower proclivity for party sup-
port and a larger marginal decrease in support across time [see Figure 3(d)], provides support for
the claim that variation in party support is, at least in part, a function of individual-level behavior
and not simply agenda manipulation. However, it remains of interest to assess whether the decline
in party unity is solely a product of member-level variation in party support. To better understand
the contribution of the member-level effects to observed change in party unity across time, we
conduct a simulation based on the above analysis. In particular, we are interested in assessing the
amount of reduction in party unity across the first two years of the election cycle [see Figure 1(b)]
that could plausibly be attributed to variation in member-level support. To do so, we first generate,
for each Congress separately, the predicted probabilities of party support for every member at the
mean number of days to election in year one (time t) and year two (time t + 1) of the election
cycle using Model 3 from Table 1, since it offers the best fit of all the member-level models.27 We
use the members’ observed characteristics (e.g., ideological extremism, seniority, lagged vote share,
etc.) in the calculation of their predicted probabilities. We then simulate 500,000 roll call votes at
time t, in which each member’s likelihood of casting a party vote is equal to his or her predicted
probability of party support at time t. We conduct the same simulation at time t + 1. Thus, we
arrive at distributions of party support at time t and t + 1 that we can difference to arrive at a
single distribution of predicted vote loss across the years of the election cycle.
We can interpret this difference distribution as giving us information about the likely decline
in party support on an individual vote that occurs across years in the election cycle solely because
of the member-level effects identified in Table 1. Next, we assume that all of the votes in the
second year of the election cycle that were decided by a margin equal to or smaller than the
95th percentile of the vote loss distribution would have been party votes if not for the decline in
cated outside of the gridlock interval (Krehbiel, 1998). Therefore, we might expect that the 104th
Congress, the only Congress that marks a change in party control during the period of analysis,
would exhibit a higher baseline party support than other Congresses. There is no evidence that
the party support in the 104th Congress is systematically higher than other Congresses (results
available upon request).
27We confirm this conclusion using various model selection criteria (e.g., AIC and BIC).
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member-level support across time. Therefore, we control for member-level effects by determining
the percentage of party votes that would have occurred in the second year of the election cycle if
these (near miss) votes were instead classified as party votes. This gives us a very generous estimate
of the member-level contribution to vote losses across years. Stated differently, by using this very
generous estimate (the 95th percentile of the vote loss distribution), we are biasing the analysis
against finding any residual causes of declining party unity after having accounted for member-level
effects. In particular, we are biasing the analysis against finding evidence of agenda setting effects.
If the decline in party unity can be entirely attributed to member-level effects, then there is no
room for attributing any role to majority party leaders in reducing party votes via manipulation of
the agenda. On the contrary, if the member-level effects fail to fully explain the reduction in party
unity across years — especially when we are intentionally overstating the member-level effects —
then there is compelling reason to believe that agenda setting plays an independent role.
Figure 4 presents the simulated effect that member-level variation in party support has on party
unity across years in election cycles that exhibit a statistically significant decrease in party unity
[see Figure 1(b)]. The dots at the base of the bars indicate the observed decrease in percent of party
votes across years. The tops of the bars correspond to the change in party unity across years after
accounting for the 95th percentile of vote loss predicted by the empirical model. If a bar does not
cross zero on the y-axis, then member-level effects fail to account for all of the observed decrease
in the percent of party unity.
[Table 4 About Here.]
We find that all but one election cycle (1984-86) is bounded away from zero, and many of the
election cycles still exhibit substantial decline in party unity across years. In fact, we find that, on
average, nearly half of the decline in party votes across election cycle years cannot be explained by
(a generous assessment of) member-level effects. This simulation, at the very least, suggests that
the role of majority party agenda manipulation is not a trivial part of this story. We now turn our
attention to the Agenda Setting Proposition.
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4.2 Evidence for Dynamic Agenda Setting
The results of the models in Equations 5–6 are shown in Table 2 and comport with our expecta-
tions.28 Specifically, we find that there is a marked decrease in both the probability of a party vote
and the disagreement score as elections approach. Conversely, we observe a rise in the probability
of ultra-consensual votes with election proximity. We also find that the vote type variables have the
anticipated effects, with regular passage and suspension votes depressing the voting conflict and
amendments and partisan procedural votes having the opposite effect. This finding lends support
to the notion that certain vote types are predisposed to particular levels of conflict, which motivates
the analysis to follow.
We also note that the results are robust to the inclusion of the Polarization variable. Moreover,
Polarization has the expected (positive) effect for both the party vote and disagreement score
models, but is not statistically significant for the ultra-consensual model. In other words, across-
Congress levels of inter-party disagreement are positively related to polarization.
[Table 2 About Here.]
Figure 5 shows the predictions for each of the pooled models with the Polarization variable
in Table 2 on an average vote across the election cycle.29 The predicted changes in these votes
with respect to election proximity are noteworthy. The probability of a party vote falls by over 13
28We also estimate all agenda-setting models including a variable to account for budget votes.
Generally speaking, budget votes must be scheduled and are likely to generate inter-party disagree-
ment (more than 68% of the budget votes during the period of analysis were party votes). The
results we report below are not substantively changed by accounting for budget votes, and the
variable does not improve model fit.
29The predictions are based on the pooled models since we do not find consistent effects of issue
types across the different models, and this approach allows us to assess the average effect across
issue types rather than basing our predictions on an arbitrary base category. We note that Zelig
does not support hierarchical models with random slopes, and so the simulations are based on
models that include only random intercepts. However, the results of these models are substantively
similar to those including random slopes (as reported in Table 2).
29
percentage points, while the probability of an ultra-consensual vote rises by roughly 8 percentage
points. Moreover, the disagreement score falls by approximately 17 percentage points over the
course of the election cycle. Each of these findings suggests a considerable decrease in conflict as
elections approach. In addition, the empirical predictions exhibit the hyperbolic behavior predicted
by the theoretical model (see Figure 2). Therefore, we find initial support for the Agenda Setting
Proposition.30
[Figure 5 About Here.]
Finally, we examine the occurrence of vote types that are associated with particularly high/low
levels of inter-party disagreement. Again, the advantage of this analysis is that we have a priori
expectations for divisiveness levels on these votes that do not depend on observed levels of voting
conflict. Table 3 shows the results for the models in Equation 7. The coefficients for the polynomial
terms in each of the models are consistent with our expectations that votes predisposed to generate
conflict decrease with election proximity and traditionally consensual votes increase with election
proximity. All of the polynomial terms achieve statistical significance except in the partisan pro-
cedural model. Inclusion of the Polarization variable does not substantively alter the results, and
Polarization is statistically significant and in the expected direction for both the regular passage
and amendments models.31 Figure 6 offers the predicted probabilities for the occurrence of the vote
30Given that the sample size for the analysis of the Party Support Proposition exceeds that for
the Agenda Setting Proposition by a factor of more than 72, we are unable to identify the functional
relationship between divisive/consensual votes and time with the same level of precision as for the
analysis of party support. Therefore, differences in functional behavior across the analyses may be
attributed simply to the disparity in sample sizes.
31It is not entirely surprising that polarization has a positive and statistically significant effect on
the use of suspensions. For one, factors correlated with polarization, such as legislative workload and
rules changes, have encouraged the use of suspensions (Carr, 2005). Moreover, suspensions restrict
the minority’s ability to amend or delay legislation, which is particularly useful to the majority when
party polarization is comparatively high (Binder, 1997; Moffett, 2008). The Polarization variable
is in the expected direction for the partisan procedural model, but it fails to achieve statistical
significance.
30
categories over the course of the election cycle using the complete vote type models (i.e., models
including the Polarization variable).
[Table 3 & Figure 6 About Here.]
These findings constitute additional evidence in support of the Agenda Setting Proposition.
That is, we find that majority parties are decreasingly likely to schedule divisive votes as elections
approach. This suggests that House majority party leaders respond to the electoral pressures their
members face by adjusting the agenda accordingly. These findings point to an agenda-setting strat-
egy in which majorities seek to maximize collective gains when member-level electoral constraints
are low — when elections are distant — and promote members’ electoral fortunes when constraints
are comparatively high — when elections are near.32
32We likewise subject the agenda setting models (in Tables 2 and 3) to the tests introduced in
the member-level analysis above to evaluate the pivotal politics and end-of-Congress hypotheses.
Again, we restrict the analysis to votes occurring during the period extending from two months
preceding an election to the end of a Congress. As before, we replicate the models using a dummy
variable measuring whether the given vote occurred prior to or after the election in lieu of the
polynomial term(s) of time. We find that the coefficient on the dummy variable is statistically
significant and in the expected direction for each of the models, although this variable fails to
achieve statistical significance in the amendments models in Table 3. We note, however, that
this variable is statistically significant and in the expected direction for the partisan procedural
models in Table 3, whereas the original models failed to identify a statistically discernible time
effect. Therefore, we find compelling evidence that divisive votes are strategically depressed in the
period immediately preceding election. Furthermore, using a similar method to that used in the
member-level analysis above, we find no evidence that agenda setting behavior was systematically
different in the 104th Congress (1995-96) with respect to the scheduling of divisive votes. In sum,
these findings suggest that the alternative hypotheses are not responsible for generating the time-
dependent agenda setting effects reported (results available upon request).
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4.3 Discussion and Policy Implications
We believe that these findings have important implications for multiple related literatures. For
one, our work suggests that a complete picture of variation in partisanship may require an analysis
over a more refined measure of time. In fact, partisan variation appears significantly more dynamic
than previously considered. Moreover, a finding that members adopt systematically variable voting
positions relative to elections adds to recent evidence that members’ policy positions are strategi-
cally adjusted (Lindsta¨dt and Vander Wielen, 2011; Bailey, 2007), but contradicts observations of
voting stability across time (Lott and Bronars, 1993; Poole, 2007). These findings also speak to the
expansive literature addressing the legislative conditions relating to policy change (Hurley, Brady
and Cooper, 1977; Krehbiel, 1998). Our work suggests that the timing and nature of legislative
output may not only be a function of structural features of Congress or the type of issues that
arise, but also when in the election cycle these issues surface.
We believe that these results point to two possibilities for policy implications. First, an in-
evitably divisive measure may well be postponed until after elections. We have only anecdotal
evidence to support this claim (e.g., Bush tax cuts). Additionally, the majority party is less likely
to pursue partisan manipulation of legislation when elections are near. To assess this possibility,
we once more consult the data. We know that a considerable amount of partisan content enters
legislation via amendments (Roberts and Smith, 2003). Therefore, we explore whether a bill in-
troduced in close proximity to election is subject to fewer amendments than a bill of analogous
content that is introduced earlier in the election cycle. For that purpose, we estimate the following
negative binomial model of amendment counts per bill on DaysToElection (measured from date of
introduction) and Congress fixed effects for each of the 19 major topic categories identified by the
Policy Agendas Project, where µi is the mean count of amendments and Vi the variance.33 We use
negative binomial models as opposed to Poisson models to address the issue of overdispersion in
the dependent variable (see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Gelman and Hill, 2007).
33For bills having an H.R. designation, we use the introduction dates made available by E. Scott
Adler and John Wilkerson, Congressional Bills Project: (1955–2004), NSF 00880066 and 00880061.
All other dates collected by the authors.
32
lnµi = x′iβ (8)
Vi = µi + µ2i /θ
If it is correct that one of the policy implications of our results is that partisan manipulation of
legislative content declines over the course of an election cycle, then we would expect the number
of amendments to legislation to decline with election proximity. Consequently, we expect the
coefficient on DaysToElection to be positive and statistically significant across issue types, since
the higher the value for DaysToElection, the farther away the next election is, and therefore the
more incentive there is to engage in partisan manipulation of legislation (relative to points in time
nearer to election).
[Figure 7 About Here.]
Our expectations with respect to the policy implications of our agenda-setting model are largely
confirmed. Rather than present 19 separate regression tables, we instead display the predicted
percentage change in the number of amendments from the maximum to minimum days to election
for each of the issue areas. In Figure 7, the issue areas are located on the y-axis and the predicted
percentage change in the number of amendments is represented on the x-axis. The predicted
percentage change in amendments for each issue area is indicated in the graph by one of four
different markers, with the square, the filled circle, and the triangle denoting statistical significance
of the DaysToElection variable at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. The hollow circle is
used for coefficients that do not achieve statistical significance. All of the statistically significant
coefficients (11 total) are positive and only four coefficients that fail to achieve statistical significance
have incorrect signs. Moreover, for a large number of the issue areas, the change in number of
amendments per bill is four-fold or larger. Overall, there appears to be considerable support for
the contention that dynamic partisanship has meaningful policy implications. In the next section,
we offer some concluding thoughts.
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5 Conclusions
There is abundant evidence that voters across democratic systems have rather conflicted views of
parties. While they rely on party labels to cast their votes and reward parties for policy successes,
voters at the same time loathe excessive partisanship by elites. Voter ambiguity regarding parti-
sanship, therefore, presents parties with countervailing incentives. Strong partisanship will bring
desired policy successes and present voters with a clear party brand, but too much of it, and voters
will punish legislators come election time. The question, then, is how parties solve this dilemma.
We argue that there is a time and place for partisan behavior, just as there is a time and
place for catering more directly to constituents. A key factor in this story is that voter monitoring
of legislative activity varies systematically over time. Parties and elected politicians demonstrate
behavior that reflects an awareness of the time-sensitivity of partisanship, as they opportunistically
pursue party goals when the costs of partisan behavior are relatively low (when voter attentiveness
is low). As such, this study suggests that partisanship is best characterized as a highly dynamic
process, even over the short term, as opposed to the conventional perspective, which holds that
partisanship is static or slowly changing over lengthy periods of time.
Our finding that House members and congressional parties recognize the electoral consequences
of party support and strategically adjust their behavior relative to election proximity has important
implications beyond the study of Congress. It certainly has direct import for any electoral system
that has a personal vote component. Yet, we believe that these dynamics of partisanship can
likewise be triggered by the presence of other countervailing incentives, such as conflicting demands
between government coalition partners and partisan voters. Therefore, the existence of a personal
vote is not, in our view, a necessary condition for the dynamics uncovered. More generally, we
believe that our findings speak to the larger question of representation. In particular, our study
suggests that variation in representation, as suggested by more recent research on the topic, is not
simply a function of system-level factors, but rather a process that varies within systems over time.
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Figure 1: Change in Party Unity Across Time.
Notes: Panel (a) shows the percent of party votes over two-year
congressional terms, and Panel (b) shows changes in the percent of
party votes across years within election cycles. The election cycle
is divided such that the first year extends from November of the
even year through October of the odd year, and the second year
extends from November of the odd year through October of the
even year. Changes that achieve two-tailed statistical significance
at the 0.1 level are denoted in Panel (b).
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Figure 2: Predictions for Variation in Optimal Divisiveness with
Time.
Notes: See Equation 2 for the optimal level of partisan divisiveness
across time. The probability function p(t) is weakly monotonically
decreasing in days to election, implying that increasing distance
from election corresponds to decreasing voter attentiveness.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Days to Election 0.0010** 0.0012** 0.0008** 0.0007**
(5.85e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Days to Election2 −4.03e-06** −5.31e-06** −3.43e-06** −3.36e-06**
(2.03e-07) (3.49e-07) (3.34e-07) (3.27e-07)
Days to Election3 4.68e-09** 6.27e-09** 4.26e-09** 4.17e-09**
(2.04e-10) (3.51e-10) (3.31e-10) (3.20e-10)
Retirement −0.2583 −0.2827
(0.3365) (0.3460)
Ideological Extremism 2.9874** 3.0628**
(0.1769) (0.1849)
Seniority −0.0030 −0.0032
(0.0022) (0.0023)
Lagged Vote Share 0.0006 0.0007
(0.0011) (0.0011)
Lagged Quality Challenger 0.0388* 0.0398*
(0.0190) (0.0195)
Lagged Spending Gap −0.0058 −0.0063
(0.0087) (0.0089)
Lagged District Partisanship −0.2359 −0.2762
(0.1561) (0.1613)
In-party Midterm Election −0.1022** −0.1087**
(0.0178) (0.0184)
Member-level Characteristics (Factor Score) 0.2069**
(0.0244)
Factor Score × Days to Election −2.95e-05
(0.0002)
Factor Score × Days to Election2 −1.79e-07
(5.13e-07)
Factor Score × Days to Election3 4.44e-10
(5.26e-10)
Constant 0.7073** −0.0401 1.5534** 2.4636**
(0.0199) (0.0884) (0.3834) (0.3458)
Congress Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vote Type Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Issue Type Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
N 3,967,202 1,481,238 1,481,238 1,481,238
Clusters (Unique Members) 2,127 863 863 863
Pr > χ2 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Table 1: Likelihood of Casting a Vote Supporting Party on Party
Votes.
Notes: The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of
whether members voted with the majority of their party on party
votes. Party votes are defined as votes on which a majority of
Democrats oppose a majority of Republicans. Each model applies
the polynomial order of time that offers the optimal fit. The mod-
els cluster on unique members, adjusting the variance-covariance
matrix to account for repeated measurements. Standard errors in
parentheses. ** denotes p ≤ 0.01 and * denotes p ≤ 0.05
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Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Party Support on Party Votes by
Distance from Election.
Notes: Panel (a) shows a member’s predicted probability of sup-
porting her party on a party vote by the number of days to the
next election for Model 1 holding all variables at their mean, Panel
(b) shows the predicted probability for Model 2 holding all vari-
ables at their mean, Panel (c) shows the predicted probabilities for
Model 3 for the Congresses with the highest (103d Congress) and
lowest (96th Congress) predicted baseline party support holding
all other variables at their mean, and Panel (d) shows the pre-
dicted probabilities for Model 4 for the 99th percentile of factor
score (“insulated member”) and the 1st percentile of factor score
(“vulnerable member”) holding all other variables at their mean.
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crease [see Figure 1(b)]. Dots at the base of the bars indicate the
observed decrease in percent of party votes across years. The tops
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ter accounting for the 95th percentile of vote loss predicted by the
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Figure 5: Predictions for the Timing of Divisive/Consensual Votes.
Notes: Panel (a) shows the predicted probability of a party vote
by the number of days to the next election (results from “Party
Vote” model in Table 2), Panel (b) shows the predicted probability
of an ultra-consensual vote by days to the next election (results
from “Ultra-Consensual” model in Table 2), and Panel (c) shows
the predicted absolute difference in the percent of Democrats and
Republicans voting yea by days to the next election (results from
“Disagreement Score” model in Table 2).
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Figure 6: Predictions of Timing of Vote Types.
Notes: Panel (a) shows the predicted probability of regular pas-
sage votes by the number of days to the next election (results from
“Regular Passage” model in Table 3), Panel (b) shows the pre-
dicted probability of suspension votes by days to the next election
(results from “Suspensions” model in Table 3), Panel (c) shows the
predicted probability of amendment votes by days to the next elec-
tion (results from “Amendments” model in Table 3), and Panel
(d) shows the predicted probability of partisan procedural votes
by days to the next election (results from “Partisan Procedural”
model in Table 3).
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Figure 7: Predicted Change in Percentage of Amendments by Topic
from Maximum to Minimum Number of Days to Election.
Notes: Figure shows the predicted percentage change in number of
amendments per bill comparing bills introduced at the maximum
number of days to election (730) to bills introduced at the mini-
mum number of days to election (1). Predictions for each topic are
generated by a negative binomial regression model using number of
amendments per bill as the dependent variable and the number of
days to election from the date of the bill’s introduction as the inde-
pendent variable. Estimates are from separate regressions by topic
area with Congress fixed effects included. Negative values indicate
that there were more amendments at the end of the election cycle
than in the beginning (the reverse of the expected effect, though
none of the negative effects are based on statistically significant
coefficients for DaysToElection).
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